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AN UNWORKABLE RESULT: EXAMINING THE 
APPLICATION OF THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS DOCTRINE 
TO LAW FIRM BANKRUPTCIES 
ABSTRACT 
The disastrous effect of the 2008 global financial crisis on the American 
legal industry is still evident. Some of America’s largest, most prestigious law 
firms, firms thought to be insulated from such a crisis, succumbed to the 
economic aftershocks. As failed firms and their creditors attempt to pick up the 
pieces, jurisdictions across America have grappled with determining who owns 
the right to revenue from client business that was still pending at the time of 
bankruptcy. 
When a law firm dissolves, the legal issues underlying unfinished client 
business do not cease to exist—nor does a former partner’s desire to continue 
practicing law. Unfinished business claims are the result of the partners of a 
bankrupt firm finding new employment and taking their old clients with them. 
Arguing that fees derived from work started at the bankrupt firm is property of 
that firm’s bankruptcy estate, trustees bring unfinished business claims to 
recover this revenue. In many cases, the trustees have succeeded. 
Recent debate has centered on whether pending hourly fee arrangements 
should be included in the bankruptcy estate. The underlying basis for these 
unfinished business claims is based on antiquated law that does not apply to 
the modern legal industry. This Comment will demonstrate that extending 
unfinished business claims to hourly fee arrangements not only violates public 
policy but also creates unworkable results in a bankruptcy setting.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 merger of Dewey Ballantine and LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & 
MacRae, two esteemed New York firms with roots running back nearly a 
century, instantly created a global force in the legal industry.1 At its peak, 
Dewey and LeBoeuf (“Dewey”) employed nearly 1400 attorneys in twenty-six 
offices.2 Despite Dewey’s penchant for high-profile transactions and its 
“enviable roster of corporate clients,”3 the firm was not immune to the 
economic aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis.4 In 2012, in what the New 
York Times called “the largest law-firm collapse in United States history,” 
Dewey filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.5 
While the factors leading to Dewey’s collapse may involve more than a 
stagnant economy,6 the firm’s fate underscores changing dynamics in the legal 
industry.7 In the years following the financial crisis, some of America’s largest 
and most prestigious law firms have struggled to stay afloat as they attempt to 
navigate a changing industry in a slowly recovering economy.8  
So, what happens when a firm like Dewey fails? For one, partners of the 
failed firm need to find a landing spot. Competing firms are more than happy 
 
 1 Allan D. Frank, The End of an Era: Why Dewey & LeBoeuf Went Under, FORTUNE (May 29, 2012 
2:32 PM), http://fortune.com/2012/05/29/the-end-of-an-era-why-dewey-leboeuf-went-under/. 
 2 Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 28, 2012, 10:21 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-bankruptcy/. 
 3 James B. Stewart, The Collapse: How a Top Legal Firm Destroyed Itself, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 14, 
2013, at 60, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/10/14/the-collapse-2. 
 4 See James B. Stewart, Dewey’s Fall Underscores Law Firm’s New Reality, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/business/deweys-collapse-underscores-a-new-reality-for-law-firms-
common-sense.html?pagewanted=all. 
 5 In re Dewey & LeBoeuf, Ch. 11 Case No. 12-12321, Adv. No. 12-01672 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2012); 
see also Stewart, The Collapse, supra note 3. 
 6 Megan Leonhardt, Dewey Partners Press DA to Bring Charges Against Firm Head, LAW360 (Apr. 26, 
2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/334828/dewey-partners-press-da-to-bring-charges-against-firm-head: 
A group of Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP partners has asked the New York district attorney to bring 
criminal charges against the chairman of the tottering firm, which could close its doors as early as 
next week, a source familiar with the matter said Thursday. The source told Law360 that an 
undisclosed number of partners from Dewey asked the New York County district attorney to 
charge Chairman Steven H. Davis with embezzlement, wire fraud, mail fraud and other criminal 
activity. 
 7 Stewart, Dewey’s Fall, supra note 4. 
 8 See Lattman, supra note 2; see also Stewart, Dewey’s Fall, supra note 4 (“Recent years have seen the 
demise of once-respected names like Howrey & Simon; Coudert Brothers; Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison; and 
Heller Ehrman.”). 
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to welcome talented attorneys, and their books of business, with open arms.9 In 
a growing source of litigation, trustees of bankrupt firms want to ensure that 
the displaced partners are not taking more than they should to their new 
firms.10  
Unfinished business claims provide for “post-dissolution profits arising 
from the work of former partners at new firms on matters that began at the 
dissolved firm to be deemed property of the old firm’s estate and to be 
available to pay creditors of the old firm.”11 In plainer terms, trustees argue 
that any post-dissolution work derived from client business started at the 
bankrupt firm is property of the bankrupt firm’s estate.12 The underlying 
rationale for unfinished business claims has roots in state partnership laws, 
which provide that partners of a dissolved firm have a fiduciary duty to  
wind-up any pending business.13 
Unfinished business claims have played a role in nearly every major law 
firm bankruptcy in the past ten years.14 As major law firm bankruptcies 
become more prevalent, scholarly debate has centered on whether unfinished 
business qualifies as property of the estate.15 In June and July of 2014, two 
separate decisions, In re Thelen LLP in New York and Heller Ehrman LLP v. 
Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP in the Northern District of California, held that 
client cases pending at the time of bankruptcy are not property of the bankrupt 
law firm’s estate.16 Though many in the legal community felt that these 
 
 9 Rachel M. Arnett, Comment, Current Developments 2012-2013: Ripping the Jackson Pollock off the 
Wall: Reconciling Jewel v. Boxer with the Modern Law Firm, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557, 569 (2013). 
 10 Pamela Phillips, Beware “Jewel” Risks in Lateral Partner Hiring, LAW360 (Apr. 15, 2014, 9:26 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/527683/beware-jewel-risks-in-lateral-partner-hiring; see Greenspan v. Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 331 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
2009) (addressing whether partners of a dissolved law firm fraudulently transferred unfinished business to 
their new firms). 
 11 See Michael D. DeBaecke & Victoria A. Guilfoyle, Law Firm Dissolutions: When the Music Stops, 
Does Anyone Need to Account for Any Unfinished Business?, 14 DEL. L. REV. 41, 42 (2013). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Mark I. Weinstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: An Analysis of Its Impact on the 
Relationship of Law Firm Dissolution, Contingent Fee Cases and the No Compensation Rule, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 
857, 862 (1995). 
 14 Phillips, supra note 10. 
 15 See, e.g., Julie Triedman, Ground Shifts Under Howrey’s Unfinished Business Claims, AMERICAN 
LAWYER (July 28, 2014), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202664908745/Ground-Shifts-Under-
Howreys-Unfinished-Business-Claims?slreturn=20140919163431. See generally DeBaecke & Guilfoyle, 
supra note 11, at 41; Ashley Worrell, Comment, Covering Your Assets: The Unfinished Business Rule and 
Bankrupt Law Firms, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 825 (2014). 
 16 In re Thelen LLP, 20 N.E.3d 264, 273–74 (N.Y. 2014); Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, 
Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24, 33 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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decisions would put an end to unfinished business claims nationwide,17 the 
current state of unfinished business claims is unresolved.18 
A clear and uniform understanding of how the law views unfinished 
business claims is imperative for firms as legal industry consultants predict that 
more large law firms will fail in the coming years.19 Thus, the purpose of this 
Comment is two-fold. First, this Comment will demonstrate that despite recent 
judicial decisions, unfinished business claims still pose a threat to firms and 
their partners. Second, this Comment will rebut the extension of the unfinished 
business doctrine to hourly fee arrangements.  
This Comment will begin by discussing the history of unfinished business 
claims while also providing context on how these claims relate to state 
partnership and federal bankruptcy law. Next, this Comment will analyze the 
statutory and public policy concerns unfinished business claims create. Finally, 
this Comment will provide practical solutions for law firms operating in 
jurisdictions where the law of unfinished business claims remains unresolved.  
I. BACKGROUND 
 The prevalence of unfinished business claims is a product of changes in the 
nature of the American legal industry.20 Historically, it was uncommon for an 
attorney to make numerous lateral movements during the course of his or her 
career.21 This type of mobility is now assumed.22 Market volatility resulting in 
an increased number of law firm break-ups has only contributed to this trend.23 
While lateral hiring is not a new phenomenon, its role in the long-term 
 
 17 See generally Bob Eisenbach, Rejecting Jewel v. Boxer: The District Court’s Heller Decision Is a 
Potential Knock-Out Punch Against Unfinished Business Claims by Insolvent Law Firms, IN THE RED: THE 
BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY BLOG (June 17, 2014), http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2014/06/articles/uncategorized/ 
the-jewel-no-longer-sparkles-district-court-decision-in-heller-case-is-a-potential-knock-out-for-claims-against-
law-firms/; Triedman, supra note 15 (“For lawyers in New York, the issue’s gone.”).  
 18 Andrew Scurria, Unfinished Business Suits Live on Despite NY Drubbing, LAW360 (Sept. 22, 2014, 
3:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/579073/unfinished-business-suits-live-on-despite-ny-drubbing 
(“New York’s highest court dealt unfinished-business litigation a body blow this summer, but subsequent 
decisions demonstrate that trustees of bankrupt law firms still have viable avenues for capturing profits . . . .”). 
 19 DeBaecke & Guilfoyle, supra note 11, at 41 (“Legal commentators and pundits have predicted 
additional law firm failures in coming years.”). 
 20 See Christopher C. Wang, Comment, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Allocating Fees From the 
Unfinished Business of a Professional Corporation, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1367 (1997). 
 21 Id. (“Today, lawyer mobility is the norm rather than the exception.”). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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business strategies of large law firms has changed.24 Attracting key talent is 
important for firms as is attracting the talent’s clients.25 The break-up of a large 
firm creates an immediate opportunity for other firms to grow by hiring the 
failed firm’s former partners, and thus, acquiring the partner’s business.26 This 
is the scenario that leads to unfinished business claims.27 
 The factors underlying unfinished business claims balance the  
attorney-client relationship against a partner’s fiduciary duty to the partner’s 
old firm.28 Placing these claims in the context of bankruptcy creates an extra 
layer of complexity because the rights of the failed firm’s creditors also come 
into play.29 This section will provide an overview of how courts have 
addressed unfinished business claims. First, this section will discuss the state 
partnership law concepts that serve as the foundation for unfinished business 
claims. Next, this section will highlight the intersection of partnership law and 
bankruptcy law, as well as the development of bankruptcy law’s role in 
deciding unfinished business claim cases. 
A. Jewel v. Boxer—The Birth of the Unfinished Business Doctrine 
Often referred to as “the seminal unfinished business doctrine case dealing 
with law firms,” Jewel v. Boxer serves as the foundation for modern unfinished 
business claims.30 In 1977, the four-partner law firm of Jewel, Boxer & Elkind 
(“JBE”) voted to dissolve.31 The four former partners paired off to create two 
new firms, one named Jewel & Leary, the other Boxer & Elkind.32 At the time 
of JBE’s dissolution, the firm was handling a number of active cases.33 JBE’s 
partners, hoping that their existing clients would follow them to their new 
firms, sent letters to their book of clients.34 The letters announced JBE’s 
dissolution, served as notice of the creation of the two new firms, and provided 
 
 24 See Arnett, supra note 9; Stewart, The Collapse, supra note 3. 
 25 See Arnett, supra note 9; Stewart, The Collapse, supra note 3. 
 26 Marc Galanter & William D. Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big 
Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1895 (2008). 
 27 Phillips, supra note 10. 
 28 See Wang, supra note 20, at 1368; Worrell, supra note 15, at 851–53. 
 29 See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 
B.R. 318, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 30 DeBaecke & Guilfoyle, supra note 11, at 44; 156 Cal. App. 3d 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 31 Jewel, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 174. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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each client with a substitution of attorney form.35 Many of JBE’s former clients 
followed the partners to their new firms where the partners provided legal 
services under fee arrangements established at JBE.36 
More than five years later, Jewel & Leary filed a complaint against Boxer 
& Elkind for “an accounting of [the fees from unfinished cases], contending 
they were assets of the dissolved partnership.”37 Characterizing the fees as 
property of the dissolved partnership, Jewel & Leary argued that it was entitled 
to some of the profits derived from the JBE cases that the partners at Boxer & 
Elkind continued at their new firm.38 In a nonjury trial, the lower court 
allocated the disputed fees to the former partners on a quantum meruit basis, 
guided by the following three factors: (1) the time each firm spent handling the 
cases, (2) the source of each case, and (3) the result of any contingency cases.39 
Not satisfied with the results of the quantum meruit approach, Jewel & Leary 
appealed the lower court’s decision.40 
While the First Circuit expressed its “admiration for the laudable efforts of 
the learned trial judge who masterfully developed a formula geared to 
achieving a just and equitable result for each party,” it ultimately reversed the 
decision.41 As JBE lacked both a partnership agreement and an allocation of 
fees agreement, the court indicated that state partnership law, the Uniform 
Partnership Act (“UPA”), should be used to resolve the dispute.42 The court 
threw out the quantum meruit calculations, holding that UPA required that the 
profits from the unfinished business be returned to the partnership and 
distributed according to each partner’s equity interest.43 The court relied 
heavily on a UPA provision that bars partners from receiving extra 
compensation for “services rendered in completing unfinished business.”44 
This provision is sometimes referred to as the “No Compensation Rule.”45 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id.  
 38 Id.  
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 175 (“Jewel and Leary was determined to owe $115,041.16 to the old firm, and Boxer and 
Elkind was determined to owe $291,718.60 to the old firm.”). 
 41 Id. at 176. 
 42 Id. (noting the firms lack of a written partnership agreement). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships: The No-Compensation 
Rule and Client Choice, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1609–10 (1985). 
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B. The No Compensation Rule 
Understanding how the Jewel court arrived at its decision requires an 
examination of the No Compensation Rule.46 In fact, unpacking the No 
Compensation Rule is critical, as the rule serves as the statutory and policy 
basis for the application of the unfinished business doctrine.47 The No 
Compensation Rule provides that “partners are not entitled to compensation for 
the winding up of the dissolved partnership beyond their partnership interests 
for services rendered.”48 Thus, a partner is not entitled to take home an amount 
greater than what his or her partnership share in the dissolved firm would have 
allowed.49 The No Compensation Rule was originally codified in § 18(f) of the 
UPA50 and in subsequent revisions and amendments of § 401 of the UPA.51  
When a partnership dissolves, a two-step process takes place.52 First, there 
is the actual dissolution of the firm.53 Second, there is the winding-up period, 
where the partners “complete the business of the partnership, liquidate assets, 
settle liabilities, and distribute profits, if any, among the partners.”54 Even after 
dissolution, the partnership technically continues until this winding-up process 
is complete.55 Therefore, under the No Compensation Rule, it follows that pre-
existing client work finished up after the dissolution of the partnership must be 
pulled back to the partnership estate.56 
The dispute in Jewel centered on the application of the No Compensation 
Rule.57 The Jewel court found that the unfinished work the partners brought to 
their new firms belonged to JBE because the work was considered part of the 
winding up process.58 Because the unfinished client business completed during 
 
 46 See Jewel, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 174. 
 47 See id. 
 48 Weinstein, supra note 13. 
 49 See id. 
 50 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (1914) (“No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership 
business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding up 
the partnership affairs.”).  
 51 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(j) (amended 2013) (“A partner is not entitled to remuneration for services 
performed for the partnership, except for reasonable compensation for services rendered in winding up the 
business of the partnership.”).  
 52 Weinstein, supra note 13, at 860–61. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 862. 
 55 See Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 56 See id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 Id. 
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the winding up process was property of the partnership, the profits from the 
unfinished business would be returned to the partnership and distributed 
according to each partner’s equity interest in JBE.59 
C. The Impact on Partnership Agreements: “The Jewel Waiver” 
In Jewel, the court held that when a dissolved firm lacks a partnership 
agreement, any profits from unfinished business must be returned to the 
partnership and distributed to each partner based on his or her equity interest.60 
After reaching this decision, the court added that the partners could have 
contracted around the requirements of UPA with a written partnership 
agreement.61 Jewel “not only [allows] contrary agreements, [it also 
encourages] partners to enter into such agreements, which can only aid in the 
timely and organized winding up of the partnership’s affairs.”62 
Thus, Jewel’s legacy is one that stresses freedom of contract.63 The court in 
Jewel advocated for the inclusion of “precise rules for completion of 
unfinished business” in partnership agreements.64 These provisions are 
commonly referred to as Jewel waivers.65 Jewel created an incentive for firms 
to amend their partnership agreements and waive any duty to account for 
profits from unfinished business.66 By adding a Jewel waiver to a partnership 
agreement, “partners no longer have any financial obligation to the partnership 
with regard to fees collected as part of the winding-up process.”67  
While a Jewel waiver is an effective tool to mitigate risk, it does not 
extinguish all risk.68 Creative claims advanced by bankruptcy trustees have 
shown that Jewel waivers are not a panacea.69 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 179–80. 
 62 Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 
318, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 63 See Jewel, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171. 
 64 Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. at 331 (“Of course, the parties were free to enter into an 
agreement providing for the allocation of fees relating to unfinished business in any manner they wished.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Rothman v. Dolin, 20 Cal. App. 4th 755, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See Arnett, supra note 9. 
 68 See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. at 331 (analyzing whether a Jewel waiver added at the 
eleventh hour constitutes a fraudulent transfer of property). 
 69 See id. 
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D. In re Brobeck: Applying Jewel in a Bankruptcy Setting 
 Despite its impact in the bankruptcy field, Jewel itself was not a bankruptcy 
case.70 In fact, it was not until recently that a court first examined the 
application of unfinished business claims during the course of a bankruptcy 
proceeding.71 In In re Brobeck, the court applied the unfinished business rule 
in a bankruptcy setting, while also discussing the limitations of Jewel 
waivers.72 
The law firm of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (“Brobeck”) operated for 
nearly a century.73 Like many firms, a strong technology practice helped 
Brobeck enjoy rapid growth during the end of the twentieth century.74 To 
facilitate this growth, Brobeck took on a great deal of debt and eventually 
found itself in financial trouble.75 After attempts to restructure its debt and a 
failed merger, Brobeck decided to dissolve in early 2003.76 Recognizing that 
the firm’s partnership agreement did not contain a Jewel waiver, the partners 
added one in February 2003.77 The day after the Jewel waiver was approved, 
Brobeck dissolved.78 Creditors filed for Brobeck’s involuntary bankruptcy later 
that year.79 
 Many of Brobeck’s partners moved on to new firms following 
dissolution.80 Brobeck’s trustee sought to recover profits from the unfinished 
business that former partners took to their new firms.81 Even though Brobeck 
had a Jewel waiver, the trustee claimed that (1) the “eleventh hour 
amendment[] to Brobeck’s partnership agreement” was invalid and (2) the 
profits from the unfinished business were fraudulently transferred from the 
firm.82 
While the court affirmed that Brobeck’s “eleventh hour amendment” was 
valid, it did find that the timing of the amendment amounted to a fraudulent 
 
 70 See Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 71 Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. 318. 
 72 Id. at 326. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 327. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 330. 
 80 Id. at 329–30. 
 81 Id. at 330. 
 82 Id. at 325. 
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transfer under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).83 In arriving at this decision, 
the court first determined that the profits from Brobeck’s unfinished business 
were property of the dissolved firm,84 making them subject to the Code’s rules 
against fraudulent transfers.85 
Section 548 of the Code incorporates the law of fraudulent transfers into a 
bankruptcy proceeding.86 This provision is in place to prevent debtors from 
“placing property beyond the reach of their creditors when those assets should 
legitimately be made available to satisfy creditor demands.”87 
The court held that a constructive fraudulent transfer occurred because  
(1) Brobeck had an interest in its unfinished business; (2) a transfer of that 
interest occurred within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition;  
(3) Brobeck was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a 
result thereof; and (4) Brobeck received “less than a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for” the Jewel waiver.88 
E. The End of Unfinished Business Claims? 
Following Brobeck, the focus in unfinished business claim bankruptcy 
proceedings has been on whether unfinished business is property of the client 
or the dissolved firm’s estate.89 The property definition of unfinished business 
is significant because it dictates the legal recourse available to the bankruptcy 
trustee.90 It is generally accepted that pending legal issues billed on a fixed-fee 
or contingency basis are property of the dissolved firm’s bankruptcy estate.91 
However, the proper categorization for pending legal issues billed on an hourly 
basis is still disputed.92  
 
 83 Id. at 348; see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 84 Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. at 337–38. 
 85 Id. at 337–39 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009); see 11 U.S.C.§ 548. 
 86 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012). 
 87 Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. at 326.  
 88 Id. at 340–41. 
 89 Compare Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
with Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros.), 480 B.R. 145 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 90 See 11 U.S.C. § 548. 
 91 Worrell, supra note 15, at 835. 
 92 Compare Thelen, 476 B.R. at 734 (holding that a dissolved law firm’s pending hourly fee matters are 
not partnership assets), with Coudert Bros., 480 B.R. at 159 (holding that a dissolved law firm’s pending 
hourly fee matters are property of the estate). 
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In 2012, two courts in the Southern District of New York reached different 
outcomes as to whether hourly fees should be defined as property of a bankrupt 
law firm’s estate.93 In In re Coudert Bros., Justice McMahon held that hourly 
fee matters pending at the time of dissolution were assets of the dissolved 
partnership.94 In contrast, Judge Pauley, writing the opinion in In re Thelen, 
held that pending hourly fee matters were not property of the dissolved law 
firm’s bankruptcy estate.95 Judge Pauley’s holding relied heavily on the view 
that classifying unfinished business as property of the estate “collide[d] with 
the essence of the attorney-client relationship.”96 Following the split, the 
Second Circuit accepted interlocutory appeals of both decisions.97 
 In the summer of 2014, the New York Court of Appeals held that pending 
hourly client cases are not the property of the bankrupt law firm’s estate.98 The 
New York Court of Appeals holding was supported by a similar outcome 
reached by the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of California in 
Heller Ehrman.99 Many in the legal community felt that these decisions 
signaled the end of unfinished business claims nationwide.100  
F. Unfinished Business Claims Have Not Been “Knocked Out” 
Despite the recent decisions in New York and California, it appears the 
courts have left the door open for bankruptcy trustees to continue asserting 
unfinished business claims in some jurisdictions.101 In August 2014, the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California issued an 
opinion arising out of the Howrey bankruptcy proceeding.102 Most of the facts 
in Howrey are similar to the recent cases in New York and California.103  
 
 93 Compare Thelen, 476 B.R. at 734 (holding that a dissolved law firm’s pending hourly fee matters are 
not partnership assets), with Coudert Bros., 480 B.R. at 159 (holding that a dissolved law firm’s pending 
hourly fee matters are property of the estate).  
 94 480 B.R. at 158. 
 95 DeBaecke & Guilfoyle, supra note 11, at 57 (citing Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen 
LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Scurria, supra note 18. 
 98 In re Thelen LLP, 20 N.E.3d 264, 266 (N.Y. 2014). 
 99 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 100 See generally Eisenbach, supra note 17 (discussing Heller Ehrman and its impact on future unfinished 
business claim litigation). 
 101 See Scurria, supra note 18. 
 102 In re Howrey LLP, No. 13-02700, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014). 
 103 Id. at *5. 
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Howrey’s trustee sought to recover the profits from unfinished hourly fee 
client matters former partners brought to their new firms.104 Riding the 
optimism resulting from recent decisions in New York and California, the 
defendant law firms in Howrey sought for the court to reconsider its prior 
denial of motions to dismiss in light of the recent authority from previous 
cases.105 The Howrey court, however, declined to extend the views of New 
York and California, and upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision.106 The court 
also allowed the bankruptcy trustee to proceed with a claim of unjust 
enrichment against the former partners.107 
The Howrey decision was the first unfinished business case following the 
string of decisions in New York and California.108 The Howrey court’s failure 
to follow the views of the New York and California courts has tempered the 
optimism of many in the legal community.109 The Howrey decision makes it 
clear that bankruptcy trustees may still successfully assert unfinished business 
claims in some jurisdictions.110 
II. ANALYSIS 
This Comment will advocate for the end of unfinished business claims by 
demonstrating that unfinished business claims are at odds with the Code,111 no 
longer apply to the modern law firm,112 and violate public policy.113 This 
Comment will then provide practical guidance for contracting around 
unfinished business claims. 
 
 
 104 See id. 
 105 Dylan G. Trache, Different in the District—Howrey Judge Relies on D.C. Law to Keep Unfinished 
Business Claims Alive, NELSON MULLINS ON BANKRUPTCY (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.nelsonmullins. 
com/newsletters/different-in-the-district-howrey-judge-relies-on-dc-law-to-keep-unfinished-business-claims-
alive; see Howrey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067, at *9–10. 
 106 Howrey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067, at *15–16; see Trache, supra note 105. 
 107 Trache, supra note 105. 
 108 See id.; Howrey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067. 
 109 See generally Trache, supra note 105. 
 110 Id. (explaining that “[t]he Howrey opinion demonstrates the importance of choice of law in unfinished 
business cases. While courts in New York and California have seemingly rendered a death blow to the 
unfinished business doctrine in those jurisdictions, partnerships in other states and the District of Columbia 
remain at risk of unfinished business suits.”).  
 111 See Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 741 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 112 See Arnett, supra note 9, at 570. 
 113 See generally Worrell, supra note 15, at 848. 
EDSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/4/2016 10:49 AM 
2015] AN UNWORKABLE RESULT 171 
A. Unfinished Business Claims are Inconsistent with the Code 
The dissolution of a law firm, particularly one in the midst of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, creates a host of unique issues.114 One challenge involves 
reconciling unfinished business claims with the Code.115 This section will 
demonstrate that unfinished business claims are inconsistent with the Code for 
the following reasons: (1) pending client matters should not be considered 
property of the estate; (2) treating pending client matters as property of the 
estate leads to a conflict between the client’s right to counsel and the automatic 
stay; and (3) treating pending client matters as property of the estate leads to 
unintended consequences regarding the use, sale, or lease of property. 
1. Unfinished Hourly Business Is Not Property Under § 541 
In Brobeck, the bankruptcy trustee successfully argued that Brobeck’s 
former partners committed a constructive fraudulent transfer under  
§ 548(a)(1)(B) of the Code.116 Judge Montali explained that this section of the 
Code “prevents debtors from placing property beyond the reach of their 
creditors when those assets should legitimately be made available to satisfy 
creditor demands.”117 He wrote that the partner’s inclusion of an eleventh hour 
Jewel waiver cut against the purpose of the statute.118 Thus, the court in 
Brobeck held that the unfinished business the partners took to their new firm 
was property of the estate.119 
The Brobeck decision sets forth an analytical hierarchy for bankruptcy 
trustees who wish to recover profits derived from the work former partners 
earn at their new firms.120 The success of a fraudulent transfer claim, or any 
other claim under the Code, is entirely contingent on whether the unfinished 
business is property of the estate.121 Thus, the threshold question in any 
bankruptcy-related unfinished business case is whether the unfinished business 
in question can be classified as the property of the debtor law firm.122  
 
 114 See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 
B.R. 318, 338–39 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 115 Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741. 
 116 See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. at 340–41. 
 117 Id. at 337. 
 118 See id. at 339–40. 
 119 Id. at 337; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 548 (2012). 
 120 See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. at 337. 
 121 See id. 
 122 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 548; Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. at 337.  
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a. Overview of Legal Billing Methods 
As a starting point, it is valuable to provide a brief overview of the most 
common billing methods utilized by law firms.123 They fall into the following 
categories: (1) contingency fee, (2) flat-fee, (3) retainer fee, and (4) hourly fee 
based agreements.124 In a contingency fee case, the attorney is “paid a portion 
of any recovery on a legal matter that he or she realizes for the benefit of the 
client.”125 In a flat-fee arrangement, an attorney may charge a fixed fee for 
completing specific types of services.126 Retainer agreements generally require 
an up-front, sometimes non-refundable, fee to be paid to the attorney.127 
Hourly fees are the most commonly utilized billing form.128 In this setting, an 
attorney sets an hourly fee and bills the client on a rolling basis.129 
As courts have grappled over whether to classify unfinished business as 
property of a debtor firm’s bankruptcy estate, a key distinction relates to the 
different billing methods.130 The nature and timing of these different methods 
is dispositive.131 As will be discussed later in this Comment, contingency fee, 
retainer fee, and flat fee contracts are generally accepted to be part of the 
bankruptcy estate.132 Recent debate has focused primarily on whether this view 
should be extended to hourly fee agreements.133 
b. What Constitutes Property in Bankruptcy? 
Section 541 sets the rules for determining what should be included in the 
bankruptcy estate.134 Section 541(a)(1) states that the estate is entitled to “all 
 
 123 Martindale-Hubbell, Guide to Legal Services Billing Rates, LAWYERS.COM, http://research.lawyers. 
com/guide-to-legal-services-billing-rates.html. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See Worrell, supra note 15, at 829–30; see also Arthur J. Ciampi, Claims for Unfinished Business 
Should be Avoided, N.Y. L.J., (July 27, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202564502246&thepage=1 (noting that the unfinished business rule has frequently applied to contingent fee 
cases).  
 131 See Worrell, supra note 15, at 842–43. 
 132 Id. at 829–30. 
 133 Compare Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (holding that a dissolved law firm’s pending hourly fee matters are not partnership assets), with Dev. 
Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros.), 480 B.R. 145, 159–60 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that a dissolved law firm’s pending hourly fee matters are property of the estate). 
 134 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012). 
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legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement 
of the case.”135 However, the Code stops short of defining what qualifies as a 
“legal or equitable interest of the debtor.”136 Collier on Bankruptcy explains 
that “[e]ven though Section 541 provides the framework for determining the 
scope of the debtor’s estate and what property will be included in the estate, it 
does not provide any rules for determining whether the debtor has an interest in 
property in the first place.”137 Therefore, courts must defer to state law when 
determining the extent of the debtor’s interest in property.138 
While the language of § 541 is meant to be interpreted broadly,139 the 
extent of what property interests should be included in the estate is not 
absolute.140 Section 541 also lays out a number of exceptions.141 Thus, an 
analysis of whether unfinished business is the property of a bankrupt firm’s 
estate is two-pronged.142 First, the court must determine whether the unfinished 
business is indeed a property interest under applicable state law.143 Second, the 
court must determine whether the property is included in the broad definition 
of § 541(a)(1).144 
c. Applying the Property Analysis to Unfinished Business Claims 
So, how does a court determine what qualifies as a “legal or equitable” 
property interest in an unfinished business case? In Brobeck, Justice Montali 
begins by noting that Black’s Law Dictionary defines “property” as “[t]he right 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 See id. 
 137 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, at ¶ 541.03. 
 138 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979) (“Congress has generally left the determination of 
property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law . . . . Unless some federal interest requires a 
different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an 
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”). 
 139 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, at ¶ 541.01 (“Congress’s intent to define property of the 
estate in the broadest possible sense is evident from the language of the statute, which initially defines the 
scope of estate property to be all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement 
of the case.”). 
 140 See id. at ¶ 541.02. 
 141 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). 
 142 See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 
B.R. 318, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 143 Parks v. FIA Card Servs., N.A. (In re Marshall), 550 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 2008) (“For purposes 
of most bankruptcy proceedings, property interests are created and defined by state law. Once that state law 
determination is made, however, we must still look to federal bankruptcy law to resolve the extent to which 
that interest is property of the estate.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 144 See id. 
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to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing.”145 A more colloquial definition 
comes from the Merriam-Webster dictionary, which defines “property” as 
“something that is owned by a person, business, etc.”146 
In contrast to the holding in Brobeck, a literal interpretation does not 
support the view that hourly-fee unfinished business should be deemed 
property of the bankruptcy estate.147 This conclusion also finds support in a 
recent opinion stemming from the Heller Ehrman bankruptcy.148 The court in 
Heller Ehrman explains that not only is future business not “determinate,” 
there is no practical way for a law firm to “use or enjoy” an asset that has not 
materialized.149  
To arrive at Heller Ehrman’s conclusion, one must distinguish between 
ownership of revenue derived from a legal issue and the legal issue itself.150 A 
bankruptcy trustee’s focus is on the revenue derived from unfinished business. 
For example, assume a firm provided services pre-bankruptcy and is still 
waiting to be paid for those services. In this scenario, including the firm’s 
accounts receivable in the bankruptcy estate falls under a literal definition of a 
property interest.151 The debtor firm is legally entitled to payment and can “use 
and enjoy” the accounts receivable in a variety of ways.152 
A complication arises when the trustee attempts to claim an interest in 
revenue from speculative services that have yet to be provided.153 As the 
trustee attempts to follow the unfinished case to a new firm, the scope of the 
trustee’s property claim appears to shift to the underlying legal issue. However, 
the debtor law firm does not own the underlying legal issue because the legal 
issue is the client’s property.154 In an hourly fee setting, the attorney bills a 
client based on work that has been completed.155 An attorney cannot bill a 
 
 145 Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. 337. 
 146 Property, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/property 
(2015). 
 147 See id.; Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 148 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24, 25–26 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 149 Id. 
 150 See id. 
 151 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, supra note 147; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 148. 
 152 See generally Simona Covel, Getting Your Due, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142 
4052970204475004574126842665466408 (last updated May 11, 2009, 12:01 AM) (discussing how firms can 
borrow against accounts receivable). 
 153 See In re Thelen LLP, 20 N.E.3d 264, 270–71 (N.Y. 2014). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 270. 
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client for future services as the agreement is completed on an at-will basis.156 
The prospect of any future work lies solely in the hands of the client.157 Thus, 
it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion where the ownership and control of the 
legal issue and its potential revenues lies with a law firm and not the client.158 
In the bankruptcy setting, what constitutes property of the estate can 
expand beyond general definitions of property.159 Even in this context, 
classifying unfinished hourly business as property of the debtor firm is 
unwarranted.160 As courts have grappled over whether to classify unfinished 
business as property of a debtor firm’s bankruptcy estate, the billing method 
used by the firm has emerged as a determining factor.161  
In the context of bankrupt law firms, contingency fee and retainer fee 
contracts are generally accepted to be part of the bankruptcy estate.162 The 
court system’s treatment of contingency fee agreements has been used as 
support for and against the inclusion of hourly fee unfinished business in the 
estate.163 While the rationale for treating contingent fees as part of the 
bankruptcy estate is valid, this analysis should not be extended to hourly fee 
matters.164 
In recent years, the majority rule has been for courts to include all forms of 
unfinished business as property of the debtor firm’s bankruptcy estate.165 For 
jurisdictions applying the unfinished business doctrine, many of the opinions 
have relied on the premise that hourly fee and contingent fee agreements 
should not be treated differently.166 The arguments for this view relate to  
 
 156 Id.  
 157 See Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24, 29 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Thelen, 
20 N.E.3d at 270. 
 158 See Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29; Thelen, 20 N.E.3d at 270. 
 159 See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, at ¶ 541.01. 
 160 See Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29; Thelen, 20 N.E.3d at 270. 
 161 See Worrell, supra note 15, at 835; Ciampi, supra note 131 (noting that the unfinished business rule 
has frequently applied to contingent fee cases). 
 162 Worrell, supra note 15, at 827–28. 
 163 Compare Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 318, 344 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying same analysis to contingent fees and hourly fees), with Geron v. Robinson & Cole 
LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying different analysis to contingent fees 
and hourly fees). 
 164 Worrell, supra note 15, at 849; Thelen, 20 N.E.3d at 270–71. 
 165 See generally Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 344. 
 166 See Worrell, supra note 15, at 848. 
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(1) the nature of the contracts with clients,167 (2) the lack of a distinction 
between contract types in Jewel,168 (3) the relative value of client matters to a 
firm,169 and (4) the structure and purpose of a partnership.170 
Courts applying the unfinished business doctrine argue that the billing 
method to which a client and attorney agree does not change the nature of their 
relationship.171 In Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 
LLP, the court held that “[t]he nature of the underlying contractual relationship 
between the dissolved partnership and its client does not alter the legal status 
of a dissolved partnership nor does it change the fiduciary duties each partner 
must honor towards another.”172 Proponents view the billing method as nothing 
more than an administrative decision to facilitate the attorney-client 
relationship.173 
In Rothman, the court decided to include hourly fee unfinished business in 
the bankruptcy estate.174 Relying on Jewel, the court explained that because 
Jewel made no distinction between contingent and hourly fees, the Jewel court 
meant for unfinished business to encompass “all matters in progress which 
have not been completed at the time the firm is dissolved.”175 
 
 167 Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 344 (explaining that the “nature of the underlying contractual relationship 
between the dissolved partnership and its client does not alter the legal status of a dissolved partnership nor 
does it change the fiduciary duties each partner must honor towards another. They remain the same regardless 
of how an attorney agrees to be compensated by his clients.”); Labrum & Doak v. Ashdale (In re Labrum & 
Doak), 227 B.R. 391, 408 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (“Unfinished business simply consists of all matters in 
progress which have not been completed at the time the [law] firm is dissolved. That one matter is to be 
compensated at an hourly rate and another on a contingency basis is of no consequence in determining whether 
a matter is unfinished business.”). 
 168 Rothman v. Dolin, 20 Cal. App. 4th 755, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that because Jewel 
made no distinction between contingent and hourly fees, the Jewel court meant for unfinished business to 
encompass “all matters in progress which have not been completed at the time the firm is dissolved”). 
 169 See Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 344 (explaining the value of client relationships by stating that “[a] 
departing partner is not free to walk out of his firm’s office carrying a Jackson Pollack painting he ripped off 
the wall”). 
 170 Worrell, supra note 15, at 840 n.89 (explaining “that the business belongs to the firm, as opposed to an 
individual attorney, because the business would no longer be carried out by ‘co-owners’ but rather a group of 
attorneys out for themselves, sharing nothing but their office space”) (citing Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at  
331–32). 
 171 Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 336. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See id. at 336–37. 
 174 20 Cal. App. 4th 755, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 175 Id. at 759. 
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Some courts also highlight the relative value of client business to a firm.176 
In one of the more notable quotes regarding unfinished business claims, the 
court in Dev. Specialists equated former partners taking key clients to new 
firms to ripping a Jackson Pollock177 off the wall.178 Unlike other industries, a 
law firm’s client base is often its most valuable asset at the time of 
bankruptcy.179 
Finally, many courts have also noted that allowing partners of firms to 
carve out different segments of clients, whom the partners essentially own, 
changes the nature of the partnership.180 The court in Dev. Specialists 
explained, “It is a general principle of partnership law that partners are 
expected to devote their efforts to the partnership business, not to individual 
endeavors. Thus, the presumption must be that the firm’s business belongs to 
the firm, and not to any individual partner.”181 Therefore, according to Dev. 
Specialists, application of the unfinished business rule to hourly fees is 
necessary to keep the spirit of the partnership intact.182 
In contrast, there is strong authority justifying the exclusion of hourly fees 
from the debtor firm’s estate.183 This is supported by (1) the time at which the 
attorney renders services, (2) the client’s freedom to terminate services, (3) the 
speculative nature of hourly fees, and (4) the creation of an unjust windfall for 
the bankruptcy estate. 
First, in Thelen, Judge Pauley noted the importance of the timing of legal 
services when he held that New York law “does not recognize a debtor law 
firm’s property interest in pending hourly fee matters.”184 Judge Pauley 
distinguished hourly fees, stating, “unlike a contingency fee case, all post-
 
 176 Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 329. 
 177 Paul Jackson Pollock (1912-1956) was an influential abstract artist, known for his “drip painting” 
technique. His work is heavily sought, often fetching eight-figure sums at auction. See Jackson Pollock 
Auction Records, ASKART, http://www.askart.com/auction_record/Jackson_Pollock/30090/Jackson_Pollock. 
aspx. 
 178 Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 329. 
 179 See id. 
 180 See Arnett, supra note 9, at 558. See generally Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 331–32. 
 181 Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 331. 
 182 See id. 
 183 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24, 33 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Thelen 
LLP, 20 N.E.3d 264 (N.Y. 2014). 
 184 DeBaecke & Guilfoyle, supra note 11, at 59. 
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dissolution fees that a lawyer earns are due to a lawyer’s post-dissolution 
efforts, skill and diligence.”185 
Second, opponents of the majority rule have also cited the impact on the 
attorney-client relationship as one of the primary reasons for rejecting a 
definition of property that includes unfinished business in the property of the 
estate.186 Specifically, the client’s right to terminate proves that the legal or 
equitable interest in unfinished business belongs to the client and not the law 
firm.187 This ownership is clear because a client may fire counsel at any 
time.188 When a client fires counsel, the client owes fees only for services 
performed prior to the date of discharge.189 Judge Pauley explained that 
“[a]lthough property is often described as a ‘bundle of rights,’ or ‘sticks,’ with 
relational aspects . . . the ability to terminate the relationship at any time 
without penalty . . . cannot support a finding that a transferrable property right 
existed.”190 Thus it is the client, and not the attorney, that owns the matters 
requiring legal services.191 
Courts following the majority rule have attempted to reconcile the apparent 
conflict between the attorney-client relationship and the inclusion of hourly fee 
based unfinished business in the bankruptcy estate.192 The court in In re 
Labrum & Doak rejected the argument that inclusion of unfinished business in 
the estate would have “disastrous public policy” implications.193 The court 
reasoned that the estate did not intend to “overtak[e] cases without client 
consent, but rather only permit[] claiming a portion of the proceeds from that 
work.”194 
While taking possession over the management of client cases without the 
client’s consent would obviously have far reaching ethical and policy concerns, 
this type of action is not required for there to be a negative impact on a client’s 
right to choose counsel.195 If a partner moves to a new firm and wishes to 
 
 185 Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 741 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 186 See Worrell, supra note 15, at 851–53. 
 187 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 31. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 25. 
 190 In re Thelen LLP, 20 N.E.3d 264, 270 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom 
Enhanced Servs., Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121 (N.Y. 2013)). 
 191 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 30. 
 192 Labrum & Doak v. Ashdale (In re Labrum & Doak), 227 B.R. 391, 408 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 193 Id. at 409. 
 194 Worrell, supra note 15, at 839 (citing Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 410–11). 
 195 See id. 
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continue rendering legal services for an existing client, the partner runs the risk 
of having to pay a portion of his or her resulting fees to the estate.196 Thus, the 
attorney’s obligation to the debtor firm’s estate could have a chilling effect on 
the client’s right to choose counsel.197  
In Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan LLP, the court refused 
to extend the unfinished business doctrine to hourly fees.198 In doing so, the 
Sheresky court explained some of the challenges a contrary result would create 
for former partners.199 If the attorney continues to represent his or her former 
client at a new firm, but is obligated to pay back a portion of his profits to the 
debtor firm, he or she runs the risk of under compensation.200 The opportunity 
cost of representing a less profitable client provides a disincentive for the 
attorney to continue representing that client.201 The attorney may also attempt 
to offset the costs due to the debtor firm by charging the client more for 
services, possibly restricting the client’s ability to afford the attorney.202 In 
either scenario, the detriment to the attorney or the client can restrict the 
client’s access to an attorney of his or her choosing.203 
Third, the very nature of hourly fee arrangements is incompatible with a 
definition classifying hourly fees as property of a failed firm’s bankruptcy 
estate.204 As opposed to other billing arrangements, hourly fees are structured 
so that a client pays as work on a case is completed on an at-will basis.205 
While all forms of billing must honor a client’s right to counsel, the impact on 
a firm’s bottom line differs.206 For example, retainer agreements may require 
an up-front non-refundable deposit in order to retain the services of an 
 
 196 See generally Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison 
LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 338 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 197 Welman v. Parker, 328 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“Similarly, the trial court’s limited 
view of the limited compensation available to the withdrawing partner for services rendered to client after 
withdrawal, should the client choose to have the withdrawing partner continue to represent him or her, would 
unduly impinge upon the client’s perceived freedom to change attorneys without cause and could have a 
‘chilling effect’ upon the choice of that option by the client.”). 
 198 35 Misc. 3d 1201(A), 1201A (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
 199 See id. 
 200 See id. 
 201 See id. 
 202 See id. 
 203 See id. 
 204 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24, 33 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Thelen 
LLP, 20 N.E.3d 264, 274 (N.Y. 2014). 
 205 Martindale-Hubbell, supra note 124. 
 206 Id. 
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employee.207 While a firm is probably always hopeful that clients will continue 
to bring business, different arrangements offer different levels of confidence 
and transparency into future earnings.208 This difference impacts how courts 
have classified different billing models.209 In general, the bankruptcy estate 
will inherit “all of the rights and obligations of the debtor under contracts as of 
the commencement of the bankruptcy case . . . .”210 A retainer fee agreement, 
as an active agreement, would fall under this definition.211 
Contingency fee agreements are also generally viewed as property of the 
debtor firm.212 A contingent interest is viewed as property because of the value 
it provides.213 This value exists notwithstanding the fact that the holder may 
never actually realize his or her interest in the future.214 The court in In re 
Greer noted that “unlike a mere expectancy interest, a contingent interest in 
property confers upon its holder a true interest in that item of property.”215 
Thus, a contingent interest does have value equal to the probability of the 
event, no matter how unlikely the event is to occur.216 Regardless of the 
probability of the contingency, there is still a clear interest in the unfinished 
business, whether it is through the possibility of a court award or from a flat 
fee agreement.217 
A bankruptcy court in Ohio applied the reasoning in Greer to conclude that 
speculative hourly fees do not have the same property implications as other 
billing models.218 The court stated that the reason for this lack of value is that 
the hourly fees are a “mere expectancy.”219 In an hourly fee arrangement, the 
debtor’s ability to realize revenue from new work is completely based on 
 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Douglas J. Lipke & Michael M. Eidelman, Section 541: Property of the Estate, in BUSINESS 
BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE 6 (Ill. Inst. CLE 2006) (citing In re Holywell Corp. 913 F.2d 873, 881  
(11th Cir. 1990)). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 8.  
 212 Worrell, supra note 15, at 835. 
 213 In re Greer, 242 B.R. 389, 399 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (“However, unlike a mere expectancy 
interest, a contingent interest in property confers upon its holder a true interest in that item of property. 
Therefore, a contingent interest in property has value, no matter how improbable the contingency . . . .”). 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 See id. 
 218 See In re Booth, 266 B.R. 105, 110–11 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000). 
 219 See id. at 111. 
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whether the client wants to continue employing the firm.220 The fact that the 
firm has completed prior work for a client is not “an agreement to agree” that 
will be formalized at a later date.221 The debtor law firm would have no 
enforceable claim for additional business at the time of the bankruptcy 
filing.222 Thus, the debtor’s “expectation of any continued or future” business 
is nothing but speculation and not a present or future property interest.223 
Finally, classifying unfinished business as property also runs the risk of 
creating an unjust windfall for the bankruptcy estate.224 In Butner v. United 
States, the court stressed that “[u]niform treatment of property interests by both 
state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to 
discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving a ‘windfall 
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’”225 The court in Thelen 
shared this view, stating that “[b]y allowing former partners of a dissolved firm 
to profit from work they do not perform, all at the expense of a former partner 
and his new firm, the trustee’s approach creates an unjust windfall.”226 
Further, the language of § 541 should bar unfinished business from being 
included in the bankruptcy estate. Section 541(a)(6) creates a key exception for 
proceeds that an individual debtor receives as compensation for services 
performed post-petition.227 The rationale is that a “professional’s skills, 
training, and license do not constitute property of the estate because they are 
uniquely personal and cannot be transferred.”228 When a former partner 
provides legal services to a client either at a new firm or in a solo practice, he 
is rendering post-petition legal services.229 
 
 220 Zachary McClellan, Hourly Rate v. Contingency Fee, LAW STREET JOURNAL (June 9, 2013), 
http://www.thelawstreetjournal.com/3l/hourly-rate-vs.-contingency-fee/ (last visited June 28, 2015). 
 221 Parks v. Dittmar (In re Dittmar), 618 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 222 Sharp v. Dery, 253 B.R. 204, 206 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
 223 See In re Thelen LLP, 20 N.E.3d 264, 270 (N.Y. 2014) (“[E]xpectation of any continued or future 
business is too contingent in nature and speculative to create a present or future property interest.”). 
 224 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). 
 225 Charles J. Tabb Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Law: Principles, Policies, and Practice 165 (3d ed. 2010) 
(quoting Lewis, 364 U.S. at 609). 
 226 Thelen, 20 N.E.3d at 273. 
 227 Lipke & Eidelman, supra note at 9. 
 228 Id. 
 229 See In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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2. Thelen: Bizarre Consequences and Unworkable Results 
In Thelen, Judge Pauley noted that applying the unfinished business 
doctrine to hourly claims might have “bizarre consequences” in the context of 
a law firm bankruptcy proceeding.230 Specifically, Judge Pauley questioned the 
“workability” of some of the Code’s administrative powers, namely  
§§ 362 and 363.231 This section will demonstrate that Judge Pauley’s concerns 
are not only valid, but they support the view that unfinished business claims 
are inconsistent with the Code.232 
a. The Conflict Between § 362 and a Client’s Right to Counsel  
The first issue that Judge Pauley raises in Thelen relates to a perceived 
conflict between § 362 and a client’s right to counsel.233 Evaluating the 
potential for unworkable results under § 362 is critical, as the automatic stay is 
arguably the most fundamental protection provided by the Code.234 Not only 
does the automatic stay offer the debtor breathing room,235 it advances one of 
bankruptcy’s key policy goals by creating an even playing field for 
creditors.236 
Immediately after a bankruptcy petition is filed, “an estate is automatically 
created that comprises essentially all of the property owned by the debtor.”237 
The purpose of the automatic stay provision is to prevent interference with a 
debtor’s property.238 The court in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Yates 
Motor Co. discussed the breadth of the stay, explaining that it “applies in 
almost any type of action against the debtor or the property of the estate. It 
 
 230 476 B.R. 732, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 231 Id. 
 232 See id.; DeBaecke & Guilfoyle, supra note 11, at 60. 
 233 Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741 (explaining that “it is unclear whether client who discharges a debtor law firm 
and transfers his case to a new firm violates the automatic stay”).  
 234 124 CONG. REC. H11,092–93 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) . 
 235 Delpit v. C.I.R., 18 F.3d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Congress intended to give debtors ‘a breathing 
spell’ from their creditors and to stop ‘all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.’ The 
automatic stay allows debtors, during the period of the stay, ‘to be relieved of financial pressures that drove 
[them] into bankruptcy.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 54 (1978), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840). 
 236 See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, at ¶ 541.01. 
 237 In re Howrey LLP, No. 13-02700, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug, 8. 2014). 
 238 Bishop v. Geno Designs, 631 S.W.2d 581, 582 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (explaining that “[t]he 
purpose of the automatic stay provision is to prevent interference with the debtor’s property during involuntary 
bankruptcy proceeding”). 
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stays collection efforts, harassment, and interference with the debtor's 
assets.”239 
Treating unfinished hourly business claims as property of the estate creates 
an irreconcilable rift between the automatic stay and a client’s right to choose 
counsel.240 A client’s right to counsel, along with his or her choice of counsel, 
is one of the basic elements of the American judicial system.241 A client may 
terminate his or her relationship with a specific attorney or law firm at any 
time.242 
Classifying unfinished business as property of the estate creates a number 
of scenarios that potentially violate a client’s right to counsel.243 Assume a 
court orders that the unfinished business of a client be included in the 
bankruptcy estate of the debtor law firm.244 As is common in bankruptcy, the 
debtor firm dissolves.245 After dissolution, the firm no longer has the resources 
to provide legal services to the client.246 Thus, the client has two options. The 
client can follow a displaced partner, who knows his or her case, to that 
partner’s new firm, or the client can hire new counsel.  
A potential complication arises when the client transfers his or her case to a 
new firm.247 Because the client’s unfinished business is property of the debtor 
firm’s estate, the client’s transfer could be viewed as “an exercise of control 
over property of the estate.”248 Thus, by exercising his or her right to counsel, 
the client may be violating the automatic stay249 and could theoretically be 
penalized with contempt of court.250 
 
 239 159 Ga. App. 215, 217 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981). 
 240 See Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);  
11 U.S.C.§ 362 (2012). 
 241 Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 1981) (“[It is] well rooted in our 
jurisprudence that a client may at any time, with or without cause, discharge an attorney.”). 
 242 Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741. 
 243 Id. 
 244 See generally Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison 
LLP), 408 B.R. 318 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 245 See generally id. 
 246 See generally id. 
 247 Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741. 
 248 See id. 
 249 See id. 
 250 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012);  
see Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741. 
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Further, the underlying purpose of the automatic stay also appears to be at 
odds with the inclusion of unfinished business in the bankruptcy estate.251 The 
legislative history of the Code supports the view that it was Congress’s “intent 
that the automatic stay be broadly enforced so as to preserve the status quo as 
of petition date . . . .”252  
Locking a client’s unfinished business into the bankruptcy estate does not 
preserve the status quo. Instead, it changes the nature of the firm’s relationship 
with the client. Prior to bankruptcy, a firm’s interest in future hourly-fee work 
is entirely speculative.253 Providing the law firm with a right to future profits 
creates an actual interest.254 The fact that the estate may now be the beneficiary 
of unjust enrichment does not support the rationale that the status quo has been 
preserved.255 
b. Unanticipated Consequences Under § 363 
The second issue Judge Pauley raises relates to § 363, which controls the 
trustee’s ability to sell and transfer property of the estate.256 Judge Pauley 
questions whether including unfinished business claims in the property of an 
estate would “empower a debtor law firm to sell its pending hourly fee matters 
to the highest bidder.”257 
Section 363(b)(1) of the Code authorizes the trustee to use, sell, or lease 
property of the estate other than in the ordinary course of business, provided 
that the trustee provides notice and an opportunity for a hearing.258 According 
to Collier on Bankruptcy, 
[t]he authorization to use, sell or lease property other than in the 
ordinary course of business applies both when the business is not 
authorized to be operated, for example because the debtor is being 
 
 251 See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, at ¶ 541.01; Thelen, 476 B.R. 732, 741. 
 252 Pension Benefit Guar. Co. v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 87 B.R. 779, 793  
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 253 See In re Thelen LLP, 20 N.E.3d 264, 270 (N.Y. 2014).  
 254 See United States v. Sayres, 43 B.R. 437, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (“The purpose of the automatic stay 
provision of section 362 is to preserve what remains of the debtor’s solvent estate and to provide for 
systematic and equitable liquidation procedure for all creditors. Its intended effect is to preserve status quo as 
of date of commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings.”) (citations omitted). 
 255 See id.; Thelen, 20 N.E.3d at 273. 
 256 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012). 
 257 Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 740–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 258 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 251, at ¶ 363.01.  
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liquidated, and when the business is authorized to be operated and the 
proposed action is not in the ordinary course of business.259 
The trustee sells the assets of the estate to generate revenue and pay off any 
creditors.260 
Allowing a trustee to sell client business runs afoul of the view that clients 
are not “merchandise” and lawyers are not “tradesmen.”261 The court in Cohen 
addressed the transfer of clients, explaining that “[a]n attempt . . . to barter in 
clients, would appear to be inconsistent with the best concepts of our 
professional status.”262 A debtor law firm’s ability to auction off unfinished 
business may lead to peculiar results that impede a client’s right to counsel, 
violate attorney-client privilege, and place undue control of the unfinished 
business in the hands of the debtor law firm.263 
The creation of a secondary market for the sale or transfer of speculative 
client matters is at odds with a client’s right “at any time, with or without 
cause, [to] discharge an attorney.”264 The sale of a client’s unfinished business 
takes the client’s choice of counsel out of the hands of the client and places it 
in the hands of the trustee of the debtor firm.265 
The sale of unfinished client business also raises a number of ethical 
issues.266 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rule 1.6 Comment 
[2] states: “A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in 
the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal 
information relating to the representation. . . . This contributes to the trust that 
is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”267 By selling a client’s legal 
 
 259 Id. at ¶ 363.02. 
 260 Id. at ¶ 363.01; In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 67 B.R. 360, 363 (D. Or. 1986) (“The purpose behind  
11 U.S.C. § 363 is to allow businesses to continue daily operations without incurring the burden of obtaining 
court approval or notifying creditors for minor transactions, while protecting secured creditors and others from 
the dissipation of the estate’s assets.”).  
 261 Thelen, 476 B.R. at 742 (quoting Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989)). 
 262 550 N.E.2d at 411 (quotation marks omitted). 
 263 Thelen, 476 B.R. at 740–41; DeBaecke & Guilfoyle, supra note 11, at 61. 
 264 Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741; Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 1981). 
 265 Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc. v. Allfirst Bank (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.), 282 B.R. 149, 
161 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (“[T]he proceeds from a letter of credit do not constitute property of the estate 
under § 541. Therefore, such proceeds . . . are not subject to turnover under § 542 as property that the Debtor 
‘may use . . . under § 363.’”) (dismissing the debtor’s claim against the drawee bank for turnover of property 
of the estate). 
 266 See Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741; Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re 
Coudert Bros.), 480 B.R. 145, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 267 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2015). 
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issues as a commodity, the debtor firm is inherently revealing information 
relating to the representation.268 The Model Rules also encourage attorneys to 
work with clients until the completion of their legal matter.269 Creating a 
disincentive for attorneys to continue representing their clients is in conflict 
with this rule.270 
B. Unfinished Business Claims Violate Public Policy 
Notwithstanding the statutory justification discussed in the previous 
section, calls to abolish the unfinished business doctrine find support in a 
number of public policy considerations. This section will demonstrate that  
(1) the Jewel doctrine is no longer applicable to modern firms,271  
(2) unfinished business claims undermine the attorney-client relationship,272 
and (3) unfinished business claims have a negative impact on the recovery of 
the legal industry.273 
1. The Jewel Doctrine No Longer Applies to Modern Firm Bankruptcies 
In her prescient 2013 article, Ripping the Jackson Pollock Off the Wall: 
Reconciling Jewel v. Boxer with the Modern Law Firm, Ms. Rachel Arnett 
highlights the complexities associated with applying the unfinished business 
doctrine to the modern law firm.274 Ms. Arnett explains that, “[a]pplying Jewel 
to the complex, dynamic and perhaps already unsustainable ‘Big Law’ model 
at the very least strains reality, and likely perpetuates an approach to the law 
that no longer fits the profession.”275 Many law firms, particularly global law 
firms that have found themselves at the center of unfinished business claims, 
are unrecognizable when compared to Jewel.276 The advent of different 
 
 268 See id. at r. 1.6. 
 269 Can My Attorney Quit?, LAWINFO, http://resources.lawinfo.com/civil-litigation/can-my-attorney-
quit.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). 
 270 See id. 
 271 See generally Arnett, supra note 9, at 557. 
 272 Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that 
“[t]his concept of law firm property collides with the essence of the attorney-client relationship”) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 273 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24, 33 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also 
Worrell, supra note 15, at 875. 
 274 See Arnett, supra note 9, at 558. 
 275 Id. at 566. 
 276 Id. 
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incorporation and operating methods for law firms has limited the applicability 
of the Jewel doctrine in bankruptcy cases.277  
The Northern District of California’s recent decision in Heller echoes the 
argument that the Jewel doctrine is no longer applicable to modern law firm 
bankruptcies.278 The court’s reasoning highlights many of the common factors 
in the recent wave of law firm bankruptcies, factors that were not present in 
Jewel.279 Heller distinguishes Jewel, undermining the basis of recent claims 
brought by many bankruptcy trustees.280 
In addition to public policy considerations, the court in Heller highlighted 
the fact that (1) Heller’s bankruptcy was forced; (2) Heller’s clients signed new 
agreements with the new firms; (3) the Heller partners joined already existing 
firms; (4) there were no contingency matters; and (5) the case involved the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act and not the Uniform Partnership Act.281 
Factors one, two, and three are common to many recent law firm bankruptcies 
and reflect how modern firms differ from those firms in Jewel.282 
First, in Jewel, the partners sought to voluntarily dissolve their firm.283 In 
other words, “the partners in Jewel could have, but chose not to, finish 
representing their clients on behalf of the old firm.”284 Many recent firm 
bankruptcies have been involuntary, resulting from a market crash and a 
stagnant economy.285 The Heller court stressed that the context of a firm’s 
dissolution is an important factor in determining whether the unfinished 
business doctrine should be applied.286 The court explained that Heller, like 
other recently insolvent firms, “lacked the financial ability to continue 
providing legal services to its clients, leaving clients with ongoing matters no 
choice but to seek new counsel and Heller Shareholders no choice but to seek 
new employment.”287 
 
 277 Id. at 566–70. 
 278 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29–30. 
 279 Id. at 29. 
 280 Id.  
 281 Id. 
 282 See id. at 24.  
 283 Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 284 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29. 
 285 Id. at 24. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. at 29 (quotation marks omitted). 
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Second, Judge Breyer also noted that in Jewel, “[t]he new firms represented 
the clients under fee agreements entered into between the client and the old 
firm.”288 In Heller, the clients signed new agreements with the new firms.289 
The court in Heller found that the new agreements signed by Heller 
shareholders signified a departure from the matters of the old firm and created 
enough separation to transition the client matters away from unfinished 
business to new business.290 
Finally, the court considered that the Heller shareholders joined already 
existing firms as opposed to creating new firms.291 Judge Breyer distinguished 
Jewel by explaining that “[h]ere, Defendants are pre-existing third-party firms 
that provided substantively new representation, requiring significant resources, 
personnel, capital, and services well beyond the capacity of either Heller or its 
individual Shareholders.”292 Judge Breyer stressed “the third-party firms never 
owed any duty, fiduciary or otherwise, to the dissolved firm.”293 
2. Unfinished Business Claims Undermine the Attorney-Client Relationship 
The inclusion of hourly-fee unfinished business in the property of the estate 
places a strain on both sides of the attorney-client relationship.294 For the 
attorney, unfinished business claims create a financial disincentive to continue 
providing legal services for existing clients.295 This disincentive also 
encroaches on a client’s right to hire counsel.296 
The impediment on the attorney-client relationship is due in part to how the 
relationship between attorneys and clients has evolved.297 A client’s loyalty 
often resides with the attorney with whom he or she has built a relationship, 
not with the firm.298 The client is more likely to choose an attorney with whom 
 
 288 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29 (quoting Jewel, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 174). 
 289 Id. at 29. 
 290 See Eisenbach, supra note 17 (citing Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29). 
 291 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that 
“[t]his concept of law firm property collides with the essence of the attorney-client relationship”) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 295 Worrell, supra note 15, at 854–55. 
 296 Id. at 851–53. 
 297 See generally DeBaecke & Guilfoyle, supra note 11, at 47. 
 298 See Wang, supra note 20. 
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he or she is comfortable working, and when that attorney moves on to a new 
firm, the client will bring his or her matters as well.299 
Using the Heller bankruptcy as an example, allowing unfinished client 
matters to be treated as property of the estate “would all but force former 
Heller clients to retain new counsel with no connection to Heller or their 
matters.”300 Firms that are conscious of risk would either be discouraged from 
hiring attorneys from dissolved firms or be discouraged from accepting new 
clients associated with a firm in the midst of a bankruptcy case.301 
The public policy reasoning against unfinished business claims also finds 
support in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.302 Two ABA rules 
that appear to be at odds with the unfinished business doctrine are Rule 1.5, 
Fees, and Rule 5.6, Restriction on Rights to Practice.303  
First, Rule 1.5(e) states: 
A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm 
may be made only if: 
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each 
lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the 
representation; 
(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each 
lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and 
(3) the total fee is reasonable.304 
When a bankruptcy trustee pulls profits from unfinished business back into the 
estate, the trustee is essentially forcing the former partner to split his or her 
fees.305 The situation becomes more complicated when the firm has 
dissolved.306 The estate itself cannot perform proportional services or assume 
responsibility for the representation.307  
 
 
 299 See Stewart, The Collapse, supra note 3. 
 300 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24, 33 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 301 Id. at 33. 
 302 Worrell, supra note 15, at 855. 
 303 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5, 5.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 304 Id. at r. 1.5. 
 305 See id. 
 306 See id. 
 307 See id. 
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Second, Rule 5.6 states: 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: 
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other 
similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to 
practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement 
concerning benefits upon retirement . . . .308 
As discussed above, the unfinished business doctrine creates a disincentive for 
former partners to continue representing clients associated with their dissolved 
firm.309 This disincentive may in fact violate Rule 5.6(a) because it creates a 
barrier to an attorney’s freedom to practice.310 
3. Unfinished Business Claims Have a Negative Impact on the Economic 
Recovery of the Legal Industry 
The application of the unfinished business doctrine has an economic impact 
reaching beyond the scope of a specific dissolution or bankruptcy proceeding. 
Concerned about their own liability, attorneys and firms are hesitant to take on 
matters associated with bankrupt firms.311 This restriction on an attorney’s 
ability to practice leads many firms to leave money on the table in a volatile 
market. 
The uncertainty surrounding unfinished business claims has a coercive 
impact on how law firms approach litigation. With no clear understanding of 
how damages are calculated, many law firms opt to settle with the bankruptcy 
estate.312 In an amicus brief related to the Thelen bankruptcy, attorneys 
associated with the Heller, Howrey, and Dewey bankruptcies discussed the 
challenges that the unsettled nature of the doctrine creates for firms that want 
to defend themselves.313 They argue that it is impossible for a partnership to 
“effectively manage itself during a crisis when some partners (in New York) 
believe that they are immune from the unfinished business rule while their 
 
 308 Id. at r. 5.6. 
 309 See id. 
 310 See id. 
 311 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24, 33 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also 
Worrell, supra note 15, at 875. 
 312 Andrew Scurria, Trustee Strikes $1.5M Deal With 31 Ex-Partners, LAW360 (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/579642/howrey-trustee-strikes-1-5m-deal-with-31-ex-partners. 
 313 Brief for Allan B. Diamond et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP 
(In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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fellow partners (in California, D.C., Illinois, and elsewhere) must account back 
to the firm.”314  
Leaving the law unsettled has a negative impact on firms in terms of 
opportunity cost and capital. The risk of litigation leads some firms to simply 
forego what would be an otherwise sound business opportunity. For firms that 
decide to hire partners from bankrupt firms, the uncertainty of litigation, and 
thus the pressure to settle, may increase the cost of acquiring new business. 
C. Practical Solutions for Law Firms 
Despite strong grounds for abolishing unfinished business claims in 
bankruptcy, the Howrey decision demonstrates that these claims are still 
tenable in some jurisdictions.315 This section will review some contractual 
safeguards and best practices for firms hoping to mitigate the risk associated 
with hiring lateral partners from insolvent firms.316  
1. The Timely Inclusion of a Jewel Waiver 
First, a Jewel waiver should be added to partnership agreements that do not 
already contain one.317 The timing of a Jewel waiver is material to the success 
of some claims brought by trustees of the debtor firms.318 It is a best practice to 
immediately add a missing waiver to avoid any questions about insolvency, 
and as evidenced in Brobeck, open the door to a fraudulent transfer action.319 
Drafting the provision does not need to be an arduous process.320 In his 
article, Claims for Unfinished Business Should be Avoided, Arthur J. Ciampi 
offers this straightforward and effective example: 
 
 314 Id. 
 315 See No. 13-02700, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014). 
 316 See Phillips, supra note 10; Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger 
& Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 331 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Of course, the parties were free to enter into an 
agreement providing for the allocation of fees relating to unfinished business in any manner they wished.”) 
(citing Rothman v. Dolin, 20 Cal. App. 4th 755, 759 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)); Lauren F. McKelvey & Dylan 
G. Trache, Can Bankrupt Law Firms Claw Back ‘Unfinished Biz’ Profits?, LAW360 (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&id=9753. 
 317 Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 
B.R. at 334 (“Of course, the parties were free to enter into an agreement providing for the allocation of fees 
relating to unfinished business in any manner they wished.”) (citing Rothman, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 759 n.4).  
 318 See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. at 331. 
 319 Phillips, supra note 10; see Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 408 B.R. at 331 (addressing whether 
partners of a dissolved law firm fraudulently transferred unfinished business to their new firms). 
 320 Ciampi, supra note 131. 
EDSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/4/2016 10:49 AM 
192 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 32 
Waiver Concerning Unfinished Business. Neither the Partners 
nor any third parties shall have any claim or entitlement to any 
funds related to clients, cases or matters including, without 
limitation, those ongoing at the time of any bankruptcy, 
insolvency, dissolution or termination of the Partnership, other 
than the entitlement for collections of amounts due for work 
performed by the partners or other Partnership personnel on 
behalf of the Partnership prior to their departure from the 
Partnership or prior to, including, without limitation, any 
bankruptcy, insolvency, dissolution or termination of the 
Partnership. The provisions of this Paragraph are intended to and 
expressly waive, opt out of and are in lieu of any right any 
partner, the Partnership or a third-party may have to “unfinished 
business” of the Partnership.321 
In conjunction with an unfinished business claim, trustees may bring claims 
for tortious interference, arguing “a hiring firm somehow contributed to a 
struggling firm’s downfall.”322 This often has to do with other firms poaching 
partners from a struggling law firm.323 Hiring firms may try to limit liability by 
requesting that lateral hires confirm that they will “have met and will meet all 
of their obligations to their former firm, including complying with any 
departure notice provisions in the partnership agreement . . . .”324 The hiring 
firm may ask the lateral hire to indemnify the hiring firm for any violation or 
seek third-party counsel for advice on the transition.325 
2. The Importance of Choice of Law Provisions 
While some jurisdictions have put an end to unfinished business claims, 
other courts have not.326 Therefore, in addition to the commonly accepted 
practices discussed above, law firms must also pay close attention to choice of 
law provisions in their partnership agreements,327 ensuring that the provisions 
select jurisdictions where the law is clear.328 For example, the Howrey court, 
 
 321 Id. 
 322 Phillips, supra note 10. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. 
 326 Trache, supra note 105; see In re Howrey LLP, No. 13-02700, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067  
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014). 
 327 Trache, supra note 105; see Howrey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067. 
 328 See generally Howrey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067, at *4–5. 
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sitting in the Northern District of California, applied District of Columbia law 
and extended the unfinished business claim doctrine to hourly-fee 
agreements.329 
Further, firms must be cognizant of timing and drafting issues when adding 
or amending choice of law provisions.330 In the 2012 Thelen decision, the court 
applied New York law even though the debtor firm’s partnership agreement 
contained a California choice of law provision.331 The court found that the 
firm’s fourth partnership agreement, which contained the choice of law 
provision in question, was a fraudulent transfer “because it was entered into 
while the firm was insolvent.”332 Because “a contractual choice of law 
provision governs only a cause of action sounding in contract, not one 
sounding in tort,” the court found the California choice of law provision 
unenforceable.333 
Firms can address the choice of law issues raised in Thelen rather easily.334 
First, it is important for firms to add the choice of law provision either at 
formation or while the firm is still financially healthy.335 Thus, the firm will 
have a stronger defense against a fraudulent transfer claim.336 Second, the firm 
should expressly state that the choice of law provision extends to matters 
sounding in tort. In Drafting Contracts: How and Why Lawyers Do What They 
Do, Tina L. Stark explains, “not covering torts one way or the other often leads 
to litigation.”337 As a solution, Ms. Stark offers the following example 
provision: 
Governing Law. The laws of [insert state name] (without giving 
effect to its conflicts of law principles) govern all matters arising 
under and relating to this Agreement, including torts.338 
 
 329 Id. 
 330 Trache, supra note 105; see Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 331 476 B.R. 732, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 332 Worrell, supra note 15, at 845 n.115 (citing Thelen, 476 B.R. at 737–38). 
 333 Thelen, 476 B.R. at 737–38 (quoting Drenis v. Haligiannis, 452 F. Supp. 2d 418, 425–26  
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 334 See Thelen, 20 N.E.3d 264 (N.Y. 2014). 
 335 See id. (citing Drenis, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 425–26). 
 336 See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 
B.R. 318, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009).  
 337 Tina L. Stark, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO 227 (Aspen 2d 
ed. 2013).  
 338 Id. at 226. 
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The risk mitigation strategies discussed above all highlight the importance 
of timing. Ideally, firms should parse out the plans for their dissolution at their 
formation. 
CONCLUSION 
Just as all signs pointed to the end of unfinished business claims in law 
firm bankruptcies, the Howrey decision tempered the optimism of many in the 
legal community. Howrey demonstrates that hourly fee unfinished business 
claims remain alive and well in some jurisdictions. Moving forward, courts 
should look to recent decisions in New York and California for guidance. 
Allowing trustees to include pending hourly client matters in a failed firm’s 
bankruptcy estate conflicts with the Code and raises a number of public policy 
issues. 
First, pending hourly fee matters are not property of the estate under § 541. 
Legal issues are property of the client, not the law firm. Law firms do not have 
a legal and equitable interest in speculative profits under state law. Even if 
state law were to find that a law firm has a legal and equitable interest in 
pending hourly matters, the post-petition services exception in § 541 should 
bar the matters from being included in the bankruptcy estate. 
Second, unfinished business claims create potential conflicts with the Code. 
Including pending hourly fee matters in the bankruptcy estate creates a conflict 
between a client’s right to counsel and the automatic stay. Additionally, the 
Code’s rules governing a trustee’s ability to sell and transfer assets of the estate 
may lead to a situation where client matters can be bought and sold to the 
highest bidder. 
Finally, including hourly fee unfinished business in the bankruptcy estate 
raises a number of public policy issues. Unfinished business claims undermine 
the attorney-client relationship by creating a chilling effect for partners of 
bankrupt firms who wish to continue representing former clients. This chilling 
effect adversely impacts a client’s right to counsel and places a restriction on 
an attorney’s right to practice. Further, the costs associated with litigating and  
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settling these claims have a negative impact on the economic recovery of an 
industry still reeling from the financial crisis. 
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